Suchergebnisse

La décollectivisation agraire de la Roumanie l'a dotée d'une agriculture néo-paysanne primitive, qui absorbe de manière économe les conséquences sociales de la transition systémique post-communiste. L'accélération tardive de celle-ci depuis 1997 a conduit à une nouvelle récession globale et tend à liquider les restes du secteur agroalimentaire étatique après l'échec économique de sa régulation administrée, sans relais privé significatif. Cristallisées par le suremploi caché, les micro-exploitations néo-paysannes et leurs circuits d'aval artisanaux ne peuvent donc ravitailler l'économie urbaine qu'à des prix et/ou des coûts budgétaires durablement trop élevés pour permettre sa relance compétitive. Une des conditions nécessaires de celle-ci serait donc de libéraliser davantage l'importation agro-alimentaire - ce qui affecterait peu l'emploi agricole néopaysan, très peu dépendant des ventes agricoles - et de réserver les soutiens possibles au seul noyau potentiellement compétitif du secteur. Ceci pourrait faciliter l'adhésion de la Roumanie à TUE, si celle-ci en exploite adéquatement l'opportunité, notamment dans l'aide au développement rural et à l'exode rural maîtrisé.

Under the European Commission's Agenda 2000 proposals, CEECs' agriculture would not, after EU accession, obtain compensation for cuts in support prices in the EU 15. The aim is notably to keep these countries from further overproducing. However, a comparative analysis of the sector on both sides hardly supports this view. The competitive recovery of farm production in the CEECs is hindered owing to the ability, given the high rural jobless rate, of the dual structures inherited from Communism to lastingly shield underproduce ve labor. This pattern is protected through customs, land policy, and loose regulations about the quality of agri-food produce. The early removal of this protection on EU accession would cause an agricultural recession, a further deterioration of this sector's trade balance with the EU 15 and a sharp drop in farm labor. All this would mainly affect livestock production while fostering grain surpluses. The social consequences could be delayed by transition periods, and mitigated by appropriate rural development policies.

AbstractIn the Commission's proposals for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and enlargement of the EU (Agenda 2000), the agriculture of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is denied future access to compensatory payments for cuts in support prices in the EU15. To offset this, the acceding countries are promised a similar net amount of structural aid for their economy and society at large. This dual treatment aims at preventing agricultural surpluses and intersectoral distortion after accession. However, the actual situation and dynamics of agriculture in Central Europe (CE) compared to that in the EU does not support the surplus assumption globally, but only for certain products, chiefly grains. So far overlooked, but nevertheless, a key obstacle opposing competitive recovery, is the tendency of the dual, post‐communist agrarian structures, faced with high rural unemployment, to protect long‐term underproductive farm labour to the detriment of capital and land remuneration, mainly in livestock production. This configuration is supported by specific trade and land protections, and loose qualittative regulations that will be challenged by the EU enlargement. So, after accession under the Agenda 2000 schedule, it seems likely that CEE countries will achieve European competitiveness only at the cost of some recession, further deterioration of trade balances with the EU 15 and sharp decreases in farm employment levels. These factors would chiefly affect livestock production which, combined with crop intensification, is likely to result in a substantial increase in grain surpluses. Later on, the enlarged EU will have to bear the inevitable social consequences that transitional periods after accession might otherwise have postponed.

L'analyse de l'Economie de Type Soviétique (ETS) comme dysfonctionnement ou réalisation imparfaite de l'« Économie Centralement Planifiée » a beaucoup apporté à sa connaissance et à sa compréhension. En revanche, cette problématique évitait largement la question des voies et moyens, en réalité largement décentralisés, par lesquels l'ETS a positivement assuré longtemps sa cohérence, sa viabilité et son progrès.
La construction de l'« économie de la pénurie » (J. Kornaï et ses disciples) a ouvert ce champ à l'analyse économique en élucidant le rôle-clef joué, sur ce plan, par les ajustements et rétroactions de « pénurie », à l'œuvre à tous les niveaux de l'économie. Mais la qualité et l'orientation de ces auto-régulations décentralisées apparaissent comme hautement tributaires de celles des lois de comportement des acteurs économiques de tout niveau et de leurs relations sociales spécifiques, dont l'assemblage global compose l'« Ordre Social Soviétique ». Nos observations, comme les progrès de la sociologie non officielle de l'ère communiste à l'Est, nous indiquent que c'est en effet essentiellement en tant que sujets de cet ordre social que ces acteurs agissent.
Cette approche conduit à considérer cet ordre social comme le « système nerveux » décentralisateur et unificateur de l'ETS. Elle a des conséquences importantes pour l'analyse de celle-ci à l'époque communiste, mais aussi pour celle des décompositions et recompositions économiques du post-communisme.

Restructuring Soviet agriculture : political acceleration — economic freeze and recession.
In the spring of 1990, the quasi stagnation of the three previous years developed into characteristic recession, both in the agricultural sector and in the overall economy. The break-up of the old Party State hierarchical pyramid and its replacement by elected regional authorities led to the decomposition of the old system of centralized administrative allocation of food and agricultural produce, at a time when the conditions for the development of an overall regulation through the market are still a long way from being met. The result is a general fall, (drastic in certain of the peripheral republics) in plant and animal procurements and allocations, to the disadvantage of the towns, and of deficit areas.
In this climate of general destabilization of the command economy, the relentless pursuit of ever more radical rules of agricultural restructuring seems to come too late. The actual application of these laws and their economic effects continue to be severely inhibited, or nullified, by growing uncertainty about the future, and, while there has been no emergence of market-money relations (the financial crisis is still waiting for a solution), by a still persistant and very marked dependence by the basic producing units on the bodies responsible for allocation of resources and production tasks.
It is always possible, however, that under the mounting pressures of the food crisis, the recently-elected republican and regional authorities may actively exploit their new legal powers in the pursuit of totally new policies on structures and distribution. But it seems reasonable to conclude that in the months, and possibly the years, that lie ahead, the negative effects of the general breakdown in the command economy may nullify the productive and economic effects of such regional initiatives, in agriculture, as elsewhere... so long as there is no sign of a logical reconstitution of the system along market-money lines. However, this avenue is still blocked by the monetary and financial crisis to which a solution is yet to be found.

The modernization of private agriculture in a socialized economy : the Polish policy turn
After forty years of consolidation and functioning of a soviet-type economy in Poland, individual farming remains its key source of agricultural and food products. However, a lasting discriminatory policy towards it, and multiform attempts of socializing it, have delayed and hindered its modernization and seemed so far to show its structural incompatibility with this system, then the necessary liquidation, or substantial reduction, of this phenomenon, atypical in the east european economies. Moreover the west european scenario of agricultural modernization, where the money-market self- regulation has played the crucial role (even though it was complicated by the interference of a considerable state-corporate apparatus), has proved, for this reason, to be inassimilable by Poland.
Yet the recent developments suggest another view of this long and difficult coexistence, namely a slow learning process by trial and error, of a specific and historically unprecedented way of selective modernization of individual farms, and of their integration into the global economy and society, quite consistent with the « distributive » logic of the latters.
The new Polish farm policy in the 80s, that the national economic depression seems to have freed from the previous inhibiting commitment to the « necessary » agricultural socialization, and its first productive and economic results, tend to confirm the reality and pertinence of a turning point in this direction. But simultaneously they show the need for its strenthening, towards a true structural mutation of the modernized farms, especially their specialisation, and the difficulty of such a mutation in the present state of their relations with the agricultural administration.

Alain Pouliquen. — Agriculture in Bulgaria and East Germany. A purely Soviet line ?
During the 1970's, in Bulgaria and the GDR, as in the Soviet Union, the food and agricultural sectors of the economy were restructured along « industrialist » lines, the object being to introduce a new type of administration based on rational technocracy and the delegation of economic responsibilities to large integrated units of production.
In Bulgaria and the GDR this veritable transformation of socio-economic relations took place on a large scale and in a particulary radical and spectacular fashion, not only by reason of favourable « objective conditions » (e.g. climate, availability of the appropriate industrial means, infrastructures) but also because it was imposed by a strong, central State authority on a sort of social vacuum. In the case of the GDR, the change was also facilitated by the existence of a particular pre-socialist sociological heritage.
In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the transformation has had only a very limited scope and success, for it straightway came up against a relatively dense network of peripheral social relationships and traditional attitudes, which were deeply rooted in older organisational structures. The result has been an increasing divergence between existing economic and social mechanisms, which is often underestimated in the West. The move towards a pragmatic and « economist » — orientated modification of the economic structure, which followed in 1977-78, has not lessened this divergence. In fact, in both Bulgaria and the GDR, this strategy was essentially dictated by the agronomic, economic and ecological contradictions arising from the radical nature, and the extent, of the « industrialization » which was carried out.
It is a modified version of the latter, not simply a return to the earlier model, and it is being implemented, for the afore — mentioned « social » reasons, with more determination, coherence and success than in the USSR itself, though it does not, for all that, approach convergence with the « Hungarian road ».

Ökonomische Zwänge und Anpassungen in der Landwirtschaft der osteuropäischen Länder und deren Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsorganisation und Lebensweise im Agrarsektor. Zusammenfassende,problemorientierte Abhandlung über die einschlägigen Entwicklungen 1965-1980 sowie deren Besonderheiten in den einzelnen Staaten Osteuropas. BIOst/Hat

A l'époque de la collectivisation agricole en U.R.S.S. c'est la persistance des faits (socio-économiques) qui a très vite imposé une organisation du travail collectif à base de brigades territoriales de polyculture et (ou) d'élevage, après une première tentative d'organisation centralisée.
Mais l'histoire ultérieure a modifié profondément les données du problème, avec l'affectation des machines aux brigades, puis la généralisation du salariat de type industriel dans l'agriculture socialisée, et enfin un essor spectaculaire de la mécanisation agricole complexe (années 70). Tout ceci a encouragé une nouvelle tentative d'organisation centralisée et très parcellisée du travail, cette fois sur un mode « industriel » sensu-stricto. Pourtant, cette fois encore, les spécificités de l'agriculture ont imposé en général un compromis avec cette logique « industrialiste » radicale, sous la forme rationalisée du « collectif noyau » ; c'est-à-dire la brigade ou zveno « de mécanisateurs » qui remplace progressivement l'ancienne brigade « de motoculture » très diversifiée et encore majoritaire. La logique d'intéressement et de responsabilisation économiques de ces nouveaux collectifs, encore minoritaires, tend même à être poussée jusqu'à la forme extrême du collectif « sans normes », autogérant vraiment l'organisation et la rémunération de son travail. Mais le succès économique de ce mouvement tend à être gêné par un certain nombre d'obstacles « systémiques » globaux.
C'est là une des raisons pour lesquelles on tentera, dans la deuxième partie, d'expliquer les restructurations à l'œuvre, et leur résultats, au regard des impératifs et des divers mécanismes, propres au système soviétique, du contrôle social de l'acitivité économique, et de leurs lois de combinaison : les dysfonctionnements et limites inévitables de 1' « économie de commande » (planification centrale et directe de toute l'activité), niveau des sous-unités de base du système, appellent une combinaison de mécanismes correcteurs qui sont principalement les suivants :
1. Une radicalisation du schéma de 1' « économie de commande », s'appuyant sur une simplification maximale de l'appareil de production, par concentration et spécialisation des sous unités. C'est là, bien plus que dans des considérations « neutres » d'optimisation technique et micro-économique, que réside l'explication principale des formes spectaculaires qu'a prise parfois « l'industrialisation agraire », surtout en production végétale. Mais ces formes se heurtent à certaines spécificités socio-techniques encore fortes de l'agriculture.
2. Un recours partiel, et en fait tout à fait annexe, à la stimulation et à la déconcentration économiques des sous unités. Mais on se heurte vite ici à certaines contradictions avec la logique dominante de l'économie de commande et celle, complémentaire, qui suit.
3. Le recours au complément vital qu'est le système, spécifiquement soviétique d'intégration et de « contrôle collectif des personnes » en tant que telles, dont l'axe central est le Parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique.
Dans la deuxième partie, on analyse donc les lois de la combinaison, contradictoire et complémentaire à la fois, de ces divers mécanismes correcteurs de contrôle social, et on applique cette analyse au cas de l'organisation du travail agricole, qui est particulièrement révélateur de ces lois.

Industrialization of Agriculture in the G.D.R.: Appearance of New Contradictions and New Organizational Solutions.
This study brings the reader up to date on the "industrial" restructuring of the East German food and agricultural sector, a particularly advanced and therefore important example. It takes a fresh look at the aims involved, their attendant contradictions and solutions, in the light of recent direct observation.
The combined logic of mechanisation, concentration and specialisation, taken here to the extreme, entails serious ecological problems: increased risk of plant and animal disease, high energy consumption, and a grave threat to the soil by severe shortage of solide manure. The "new organic materials enterprises" represent a spectacular effort by the system to find a solution to this latter problem, though in practice it appears imperfect and capital intensive.
Again, overspecialization of basic units does seem to have aggravated the shortage of agricultural manpower, though it was this very shortage that had originally given rise to the drive for agrarian industrialization. It is interesting to observe present-day attempts to find new methods of seasonal inter-enterprise mobility in the labour force, as well as greater diversification of skills. Another problem which hitherto had either been ignored, or imperfectly understood, is that of Vertical' and 'horizontal' systems of co-ordination between related agricultural and agro-industrial specialized entities, which in effect become "macro-units for separate reproduction of capital". However, within these units, direction and regulation of flows of material and capital are still governed by political rather than economic considerations (given the influence exerted by the Party). These new structures make possible new methods of "socialization" and the productive recycling of differential rents, a key problem in a system where such market regulators as prices and profits play a minor role.
Broadly, this study attempts a fresh analysis of the organizational and technical choices for industrialization open to a socialist agricultural economy, with particular emphasis on their global socio-economic aims.